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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DUE PROCESS-JUDGMENT
AND SENTENCE-JUDGE'S DISCRETION To CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
FALSE TESTIMONY-The United States Supreme Court has held that
neither the due process clause nor 18 U.S.C. § 3481, which guaran-
tees a criminal defendant's right to take the stand in his own de-
fense, precludes a judge, in determining sentence, from taking into
account his belief that the defendant's testimony under oath con-
tained willful and material falsehoods.
United States v. Grayson, 98 S. Ct. 2610 (1978)
In August 1975, Ted Grayson was serving a three year sentence
in a federal prison for distributing a controlled substance. In Octo-
ber, he escaped from prison but was apprehended two days later in
New York City. After being indicted for this escape pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 751(a),' Grayson was tried before a jury in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His
sole defense was duress-that he had been forced to flee from prison
because of threats to his life made by other inmates. Crucial aspects
of Grayson's story were contradicted by the government's rebuttal
evidence and cross-examination. The jury disbelieved Grayson's
testimony and returned'a verdict of guilty.
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the judge noted that he
could sentence Grayson to a maximum five year prison term without
specifying any reason. 2 He then proceeded to impose a two year
sentence rather than a lighter one because he believed that the
defendant had lied on the witness stand.' Grayson appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which initially
affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court.' Upon rehear-
ing, however, that court directed that Grayson's sentence be va-
cated,5 believing that Poteet v. Fauver,6 required that the case be
1. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part that "[wihoever escapes or at-
tempts to escape ... shall ... be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both; .... "
2. United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103, 104 (3d Cir. 1976). In Grayson, the court of
appeals observed that the trial court properly noted that it could, without giving any explana-
tion, sentence Grayson to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by the statute.
3. Id. at 105 (quoting from the District Court record). "Secondly, it is my view that your
defense was a complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever. I feel it is proper
for me to consider that fact in the sentencing, and I will do so."
4. United States v. Grayson, No. 76-1646 (3d Cir., filed Sept. 16, 1976).
5. United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1976).
6. 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1975). In Poteet, the court of appeals observed that a defendant
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remanded for resentencing without consideration of the false testi-
mony. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve a conflict among the courts of appeals." The Court, in a 6-3
decision,' reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the district
court sentence. 0
Speaking through Chief Justice Burger, the majority concluded
that the sentencing judge must be allowed to consider his belief that
the defendant committed perjury on the witness stand when deter-
mining the appropriate sentence." The Court stressed,, however,
that its decision was not intended to mean that every defendant who
takes the stand in his own defense and is subsequently found guilty
should have his sentence increased because the judge did not believe
his story.
2
In arriving at this decision, the Court initially referred to its 1949
decision of Williams v. New York,'" in which Justice Black noted
that the prevalent modern philosophy of penology is that the pun-
had a right to defend, and although he is not privileged to commit perjury in that defense,
the sentencing judge may not add a penalty because he believes the defendant lied. Id. at
396 (citing State v. Poteet, 61 N.J. 492, 495-96, 295 A.2d 857, 858 (1972)). But see note 63
and accompanying text infra.
7. 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
8. Prior to Grayson, the Supreme Court maintained that consideration of the defendant's
perjury was not permitted in certain circuits. See, e.g., Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3d
Cir. 1975); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969). However, in other circuits
the sentencing judge was permitted to consider the defendant's perjury as a factor in the
determination of the appropriate sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958
(5th Cir. 1976); Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Moore,
484 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Wallace, 418 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Levine, 372 F.2d 70 (7th
Cir. 1967); and Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1951). But see notes 62-65
and accompanying text infra for discussion of this conflict.
9. Chief Justice Berger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
10. United States v. Grayson, 98 S. Ct. 2610, 2618 (1978).
11. Id.
12. The Court emphasized:
Rather, we are reaffirming the authority of a sentencing judge to evaluate carefully a
defendant's testimony on the stand, determine-with a consciousness of the frailty of
human judgment-whether that testimony contained willful and material falsehoods,
and, if so, assess in light of all the other knowledge gained about the defendant the
meaning of that conduct with respect to his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration
to a useful place in society.
Id.
13. 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (in determining sentence judge may consider evidence of prior
criminal conduct by the defendant in the presentence report in order to better determine his
rehabilitative needs).
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ishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. Accord-
ingly, sentences should be determined with an eye toward the refor-
mation and rehabilitation of offenders. 4 In order to best achieve
these objectives in Grayson, the Court relied upon Williams and
United States v. Tucker,5 which it cited for the proposition that
nearly all aspects of the defendant's character and past history
should be available to the judge to enable him to reach a rational,
well-founded decision on the defendant's prospects for rehabilita-
tion.
The majority rejected Grayson's constitutional argument that
this method of sentencing constituted punishment for the crime of
perjury for which he had not been indicted, tried, or convicted by
due process." Grayson did not contend that the district court had
an impermissible purpose in considering his perjury, but rather that
perjury could conceivably be considered by a sentencing judge for
the impermissible purpose of saving the government the burden of
a seperate perjury prosecution. Grayson maintained that since the
end result in either instance is increased time in prison, and since
it is nearly impossible to determine whether a court considers per-
jury for a permissible or impermissible purpose, any consideration
of perjury must be disallowed to insure due process to every criminal
defendant. 7 The Court, however, found these reasons to be insuffi-
cient justification for terminating that which it and Congress have
declared appropriate judicial conduct, and noted that the govern-
ment's interest, as well as the offender's, in arriving at a rational
determination of sentence, is one of the highest order." The majority
also asserted that its decision in Williams9 supported the view that
a trial judge should be able to consider a defendant's apparent
14. Id. at 248.
15. 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (judge may conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlim-
ited either as to the kind of information that can be considered or the source from which it
comes).
16. 98 S. Ct. at 2617.
17. Id.
18. Id. The Court stated that the Government's interest more than justifies the risk that
Grayson asserted is present when a sentencing judge considers a defendant's untruthfulness
under oath. Id.
19. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). In Williams, the Court concluded that in determining sentence,
consideration of evidence of prior criminal activity for which the defendant was neither tried
nor convicted does not violate due process. The defendant was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment by the jury. Nevertheless, on the basis of the presentence
report, which detailed other crimes for which Williams had been neither charged nor con-
victed, the judge sentenced him to death.
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perjury in determining the appropriate sentence, despite the risk
that it might be considered for an improper purpose. The integrity
of judges, and their fidelity to their oaths of office necessarily pro-
vide the only adequate assurance against this potential abuse of
discretion.2 0 .
The Court likewise rejected Grayson's argument that judicial con-
sideration of his testimony at trial impermissibly chilled his statu-
tory right to testify in his own behalf." The majority emphasized
that this right is narrowly construed to be the right to testify truth-
fully in accordance with the oath.2 To confirm this view, the Court
referred to the unquestioned constitutionality of perjury statutes.
The Court concluded that such a practice does not realistically af-
fect a criminal defendant's decision to testify truthfully, and even
assuming that it did, that effect is entirely permissible since there
is no protected right to commit perjury.3
In dissenting, Justice Stewart maintained that no determination
had been made that Grayson's testimony was false, and therefore
the majority decision essentially meant that whenever a defendant
testifies in his own behalf and is found guilty, he exposes himself to
the possibility of an enhanced sentence.24 This, he felt, represents
nothing more than a penalty imposed upon the defendant for exer-
cising his rights to plead not guilty and to testify in his own behalf.
It does not matter, Stewart insisted, whether the harsher sentence
is attributable to the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation or as
a penalty for lying under oath. In either situation, all defendants
who choose to testify in their own behalf face the very real prospect
of an increased sentence based upon the trial judge's unreviewable
perception that the testimony was untrue. Stewart favored the
adoption of certain safeguards expressed by the dissenting judge in
the court of appeals z5 in order to minimize the chance that the
20. 98 S. Ct. at 2618.
21. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964) provides in relevant part: "In trial of all persons charged
with offenses against the United States, ... the person charged shall, at his own request,
be a competent witness."
22. 98 S. Ct. at 2618.
23. Id. See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977).
24. 98 S. Ct. 2610, 2618-19 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
25. In dissenting, Judge Rosenn noted that "[A] sentencing judge should consider his
independent evaluation of the testimony and behavior of the defendant only when he is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally lied on material issues
of fact . . . [and] the falsity of defendant's testimony [is] necessarily established by the
finding of guilt." 550 F.2d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 1976) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
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defendant's truthful testimony will be perceived as false. These
safeguards, Stewart claimed, were not met in Grayson."5
Stewart concluded by emphasizing that the majority's decision
placed the defendant at a disadvantage in deciding whether to tes-
tify.Y In contrast to other witnesses, the criminal defendant can be
penalized for perjury without ever having been indicted or con-
victed. Stewart perceived this handicap to be an unreasonable one
since it tends to discourage the defendant from exercising his statu-
tory right to testify," and the defendant's failure to do so will often
be prejudicial to his defense.2 Finally, Stewart charged that the
minimal contribution that the defendant's possibly untruthful testi-
mony might make to the overall assessment of his potential for
rehabilitation 30 cannot justify the imposition of this additional bur-
den on his right to testify in his own behalf.
Grayson is the most recent development concerning the constitu-
tionality of allowing sentencing judges to consider a wide range of
information that reflects on the defendant's character in determin-
ing the appropriate sentence. Judges did not have the authority to
determine the length of sentence until the nineteenth century when
the concept of indeterminate sentencing began to develop in the
United States.3 ' Under this concept, the underlying goals of punish-
26. 98 S. Ct. at 2619 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The jury could have believed Grayson's
story and yet found him guilty if they believed that under the same circumstances a reasona-
ble man would not have felt compelled to flee from prison. Thus, in Judge Rosenn's opinion,
the falsity of Grayson's testimony was not necessarily established by the finding of guilt. Id.
27. Id. at 2619 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2618.
29. See Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 212 n.36 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Plea]. Even
though a jury is instructed not to consider a defendant's failure to testify in his own defense,
"a defendant who does not take the stand will probably fatally prejudice his chances of
acquittal." Id.
30. Justice Stewart observed:
A sentencing judge has before him a presentence report, compiled by trained person-
nel, that is designed to paint as complete a picture of the defendant's life and character
as is possible. If the defendant's suspected perjury is consistent with the evaluation of
the report, its impact on the rehabilitative assessment must be minimal. If, on the
other hand, it suggests such a markedly different character that different sentencing
treatment seems appropriate, the defendant is effectively being punished for perjury
without even the barest rudiments of due process.
98 S. Ct. at 2619 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. In 1817, New York became the first jurisdiction to implement the concept by enacting
a statute that allowed the release of a prisoner serving five years or more who had exhibited
good behavior and had served at least three-fourths of his sentence. Lindsey, Historical
Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16 J. AM. INST. CruM. L. & C. 9,
10 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Lindsey].
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ment shifted from retribution and deterrence to reformation and
rehabilitation." Within this framework, the idea of fixed minimum
and maximum penalties developed so that the length of sentence
could be tailored to serve the defendant's rehabilitative needs. :"
This concept grants to trial judges broad discretion to impose that
which they consider to be the proper length of sentence within pre-
scribed statutory limits." However, the judge's discretion to deter-
mine sentence based upon his predictions of the defendant's poten-
tial for rehabilitation presents a serious practical problem: how to
rationally make the required predictions.
In order to make a rational judgment of the defendant's rehabili-
tative needs the judge needed adequate information about the de-
fendant; in addition to the particular acts involved in the crime, he
needed to be able to consider both the circumstances of the offense
and the character and propensities of the offender. 5 Acquiring the
information necessary to make such a reasoned decision was accom-
plished most practically and efficiently by means of a presentence
investigation of the defendant's background conducted by trained
personnel.3 1 Constitutional challenges were leveled against the use
of such information in sentencing, and as a result, the increase in
the scope of information available to the judge tended to be slow and
32. See Smith, The Indeterminate Sentence for Crime-Its Use and Its Abuse, CHARmES
AND THE COMMONS 731, 732 (1907), in which the author notes that "[Tihe utmost pains are
taken to gain knowledge of the distinctive aptitudes and defects of each individual and to
apply such special training as may serve to develop his capabilities and cure his defects."
33. The idea of allowing the courts to fix sentence within prescribed limits apparently
originated in Massachusetts, where the legislature gave the court wide discretion in imposing
sentence lengths. See Lindsey, supra note 31, at 30.
34. As a general rule, the courts of appeals have held that the length of sentence is a
discretionary matter with the district court judge, and will not be subject to review so long
as it falls within the bounds prescribed by statute. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443, 447 (1972): United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972); and Peterson v.
United States, 246 F. 118, 119 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918). See generally
Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE
L.J. 1357 [hereinafter cited as Appellate Review].
35. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) (judges may
consider a defendant's past activities because they are an indication of his present attitudes
and tendencies when determining the proper period of restraint that should be imposed upon
him).
36. FED. R. CaIM. P. 32(c)(2) provides in pertinent part that "the report of the presentence
investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information
about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior




chaotic. But in Williams v. New York,37 the Court significantly in-
creased that scope of information available in the presentence re-
port by permitting the inclusion of crimes for which the defendant
was never tried or convicted. 38 More importantly, the Williams
Court stressed that every aspect of the defendant's life had to be
available to the judge for sentencing purposes if the indeterminate
sentence concept were to be meaningful.38 Congress reaffirmed this
principle by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3577,40 which provides that no
limitation can be placed upon information concerning the defen-
dant's background, conduct, and character which the judge may
receive and consider in determining sentence. In United States v.
Tucker,4' the Supreme Court further expanded the Williams ration-
ale by explicitly stressing that the judge is not limited to considera-
tion of the material in the presentence report.
Against this background, it has been suggested that perjury is not
a true reflection of the defendant's character or prospects for reha-
bilitation, and thus should not be considered for sentencing pur-
poses.4" Although prior to Grayson the Supreme Court had never
37. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
38. See note 19 supra. The Williams Court rejected the defendant's argument that he had
a constitutional right to confront 'and cross-examine the individuals who supply the informa-
tion used in sentencing. The Court thus established the rule that due process does not require
an adversary presentation to test the accuracy of information employed in sentencing.
39. The Court observed that historically a judge has been permitted "wide discretion in
the sources and types of evidence used by him in determining the kind and extent of punish-
ment to be imposed within limits fixed by law." It further noted that this approach has even
greater relevance under the modem concepts of individualized sentencing and should be
extended to include "every aspect of the defendant's life." 337 U.S. at 250. The need for this
information in an effort to arrive at the appropriate sentence, the Court concluded, far
outweighed the chance for abuse. Id.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970) provides that: "no limitation shall be placed on the informa-
tion concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offensie
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence." The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3577 specifically cites the Su-
preme Court's decision in Williams. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007, 4040.
41. 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider or the source from
which it may come).
42. See United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J., dissent-
ing) (the assumption that one who lied under stress had less capacity for rehabilitation than
one who pleads not guilty and fails to testify is weak and unproven). See also Note, Discre-
tionary Penalty Increases On the Basis of Suspected Perjury, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 677, 687 [here-
inafter cited as Discretionary Penalty Increases], which expresses the view that suspected
perjury should not be considered in determining sentence. Some of the reasons espoused by
the author in support of his view are: suspected perjury is not probative of the defendant's
prospects for rehabilitation due to the pressures on him at trial, and due to the advent of
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decided this precise issue, almost without exception, perjury has
been deemed to be probative of the defendant's prospects for reha-
bilitation and thus a relevant factor in determining the appropriate
sentence. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia is the only circuit to have directly rejected the idea that
a defendant's perjury on the witness stand is relevant to recognized
purposes of sentencing. In Scott v. United States," the court of
appeals maintained that the urge to escape conviction and remain
free is first and foremost in the minds of defendants. Consequently,
even those criminal defendants who sincerely feel remorse over their
crimes are likely to lie under oath if they believe that there is a
remote possibility that by doing so they can escape conviction.
Although the Grayson Court did not deny that there are great
psychological pressures on a defendant at trial, it nevertheless di-
rectly rejected the Scott rationale as resting upon a deterministic
view of human conduct that is inconsistent with the underlying
precepts of our criminal justice system." The Court followed the
the plea bargaining system which allows criminal defendants to plead guilty to a lesser
offense in order to receive a lighter sentence, regardless of their true character and prospects
for rehabilitation; the detection of perjury, unlike the elements in the presentence report,
rests solely on the subjective determination of the judge, who is not trained to detect perjury;
and the procedural safeguards of a new trial are available to decide the issue of the defen-
dant's suspected perjury.
43. See United States v. Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974) (under the theory
of individualized sentencing, the defendant's willingness to lie under oath before the judge
who will sentence him would seem to be among the more "precise and concrete" of available
indicia concerning his character and prospects for rehabilitation); Humes v. United States,
186 F.2d 875, 878 (10th Cir. 1951) (the attitude of a convicted defendant with respect to his
willingness to commit a serious crime like perjury is a proper matter to consider in determin-
ing what sentence shall be imposed within the limitations fixed by the applicable statute);
Peterson v. United States, 246 F. 218 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918) (perjury
unquestionably is a telling commentary on the defendant's character, revealing his continued
lack of respect for the necessity to abide by societal rules, including those not beneficial to
one's personal interest). See also Defendant's Plea, supra note 29, at 211. See also ABA
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 5.1, at 532 (1971), for a
study which established, with respect to sentencing practices, the probative value of the
defendant's conduct on the stand. The committee noted that "[tihe trial judge's opportunity
to observe the defendant, particularly if he chose to take the stand in his defense, can often
provide useful insights into an appropriate disposition."
44. 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court of appeals concluded that "the peculiar
pressures placed upon a defendant threatened with jail and the stigma of conviction make
his willingness to deny the crime an unpromising test of his prospects for rehabilitation if
guilty." Id.
45. 98 S. Ct. at 2617. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (our
criminal justice system is premised upon the "belief in the freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil").
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majority position in this area, and concluded that the defendant's
suspected perjury clearly may be deemed probative of his prospects
for rehabilitation based upon the ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose good over evil."
Conceding that perjury may be relevant for sentencing purposes,
Grayson insisted that there was no way of determining whether a
judge considered it for that legitimate reason or rather as a penalty
imposed for the independent substantive offense of perjury. 7 If it
were considered for the latter reason, this would be an impermissi-
ble practice since it violates due process safeguards. The defendant
would be receiving punishment for perjury without having an oppor-
tunity to defend himself at a trial on that issue. 8
Grayson maintained that since it was impossible to determine the
particular reason for which the perjury was considered, due process
mandated that consideration of perjury for any reason be pre-
cluded." The majority rejected this argument relying on its decision
in Williams.50 Although Williams did not specifically involve the
issue of considering perjury, it clearly supports Grayson. Evidence
of prior and subsequent crimes for which the defendant was neither
tried nor convicted may be considered although it potentially poses
similar due process implications in that it may be considered for the
impermissible purpose of imposing additional punishment for those
crimes. In light of this consideration, a contrary result in Grayson
would likely have required that Williams be overruled. Conse-
quently, the ramifications of deciding that the procedure in Grayson
violated due process would have been to remove from the considera-
tion of the sentencing judge most of the information traditionally
considered for sentencing purposes. This result would render the
indeterminate sentencing process a meaningless exercise.' The con-
tinued viability of the indeterminate sentencing process as a valua-
ble component of our criminal justice system depends on its opera-
46. 98 S. Ct. at 2617. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
47. Id.
48. However, the court of appeals in Grayson held that this was not a problem because
the suspected perjury was considered solely for its reflection upon the defendant's character,
and not as punishment for perjury. 550 F.2d at 111.
49. 98 S. Ct. at 2617. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
50. Id. See note 19 supra.
51. Id. The parlous effort to appraise character, observed Chief Justice Burger, degener-
ates into a game of chance to the extent that a sentencing judge is deprived of relevant
information concerning every aspect of a defendant's life (citing Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 250 (1949); United States v. Hendrix, 550 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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tion within this framework, and thus the need for this information
far outweighs the potential of abuse.
2
The second contention raised by Grayson was that a defendant
has a statutory right to testify in his own behalf,5 3 and that the
practice of increasing his sentence on the basis of suspected perjury
chills that right. 54 In light of the fact that the defendant's primary
concern at trial must be to escape conviction,55 it is highly unlikely
that he would jeopardize his chances by not testifying simply be-
cause of the possibility that if found guilty he mght have his sent-
ence increased because the judge erroneously viewed his testimony
as false.
56
Assuming that this practice might possibly have some chilling
effect on the right to testify, that fact alone should not be sufficient
to render it unconstitutional. The Court has emphasized in the past
that any chilling effect on the rights of a criminal defendant is
unconstitutional only if the practice in question places an impermis-
sible burden on those rights, and not when it merely requires him
to make a difficult choice concerning whether or not to exercise his
rights. In Grayson, this issue was never addressed because the
Court dismissed the argument concerning the chilling effect as friv-
olous.5  However, the Supreme Court's decision in Crampton v.
52. See notes 18 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964). See note 20 supra.
54. Judge Craven has suggested that a defendant may choose not to take the stand in his
own defense because he fears that a harsher sentence will be imposed if his story is disbelieved
by the judge. See United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J.,
dissenting). "Such a practice will inevitably chill and hamper, if not ultimately destroy, the
right to testify in one's own defense. It seems to me unconscionable that a defendant must
run the risk of conviction of the offense charged and at the same time run the gauntlet of
disbelief." Id. See also Discretionary Penalty Increases, supra note 42, at 689.
55. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (the great pressures placed
upon a criminal defendant at trial to escape conviction reduce the probative value of his false
testimony).
56. See Brief for Petitioner at 9, United States v. Grayson, 98 S. Ct. 2610 (1978). The
Grayson Court asserted that it is extremely doubtful that this practice would ever deter a
criminal defendant from taking the stand in his own defense to present truthful, exculpatory
testimony that could lead to acquittal. Id. at 2618. See also note 29 supra, for the effect of a
defendant's failure to take the stand upon his chances of acquittal.
57. See Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971). The Supreme Court held that the
practice in question is not impermissible if it merely requires the defendant to make a
difficult choice concerning whether or not to exercise his right to testify, because "the crimi-
nal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring the making
of difficult judgments as to which course to follow." Id.
58. 98 S. Ct. at 2618.
Vol. 17: 521
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Ohio,59 casts considerable light upon the chilling effect issue. In
Crampton, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's unitary
trial system in which the jury determines guilt and sentence at the
same proceeding. The Court concluded that this practice did not
chill the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination, but merely forced him to decide whether to exercise
his right to remain silent on the issue of guilt at the cost of surren-
dering his chance to plead his case on the punishment issue. If this
practice, which forced the defendant to decide whether to exercise
his constitutional right against self-incrimination, was held not to
have an impermissible chilling effect, it would certainly seem that
the same result should be reached with regard to a statutory right
such as the right to testify in one's own defense.
In Grayson, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve what
it perceived to be a conflict among the circuits concerning the per-
missibility of considering a defendant's suspected perjury in deter-
mining the appropriate sentence. 0 The Court acknowledged that
the majority of courts addressing this issue had concluded that the
sentencing judge can consider the defendant's suspected perjury on
the witness stand." However, the Court believed that the decisions
in Scott v. United States2 and Poteet v. Fauver, 3 upon which
Grayson was decided at the court of appeals level, were in conflict
59. 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971). In Crampton, the defendant challenged the constitutionality
of Ohio's unitary trial system. Because guilt and punishment were determined at the same
proceeding, Crampton was forced to relinquish his constitutional right to remain silent with
respect to the issue of his guilt if he chose to plead his case on the issue of his punishment.
He could remain silent on the issue of guilt only by surrendering his chance to be heard by
the jury on the issue of punishment. Crampton contended that this practice impermissibly
chilled his constitutional rights, but the Court concluded that it is "not thought inconsistent
with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such
pros and cons in deciding whether to testify." Id.
60. 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
61. See note 8 supra.
62. 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Scott, the court of appeals held that a judge may
not increase a sentence because he believes the defendant lied in denying his guilt. Scott's
sentence was overturned because the court of appeals concluded that the increased sentence
was a direct result of the defendant's refusal to confess, and held that "a sentencing approach
that in effect penalizes a defendant for preserving his right of appeal . . . cannot be regarded
as consistent with law." Id. at 282.
63. 517 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1975). In Poteet, the trial judge increased the defendant's
sentence because he refused to confess at the sentencing hearing. The trial judge had imposed
a substantially lighter sentence on Poteet's equally mendacious co-defendant who confessed
his guilt when he appeared before the judge for sentencing. The court of appeals concluded,
however, that a sentencing judge may not add a penalty because he believes the defendant
lied at the sentencing hearing.
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with the majority view in this area. 4 A careful analysis of the deci-
sions in Poteet and Scott reveals that such a conflict did not exist
among the courts of appeals, and that Poteet and Scott are distin-
guishable in a very crucial respect. In both Poteet and Scott, the
primary focus was on the conduct of the defendant in refusing to
confess his guilt after the jury had returned a guilty verdict. The
defendant's sentence was overturned in each instance because it
had been used in an effort to coerce the defendant into relinquishing
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his
sixth amendment right to appeal." On the other hand, in Grayson
there were no implications of coercion, since the sole concern of the
sentencing judge was with the defendant's conduct on the witness
stand prior to the jury verdict. Consequently, by characterizing the
decisions in Poteet and Scott as conflicting with the result reached
in Grayson, the Supreme Court may have unnecessarily diluted the
rights of criminal defendants in those circuits.
Although it is possible to read Grayson as overruling Poteet and
Scott and permitting judges to impose enhanced sentences upon
criminal defendants when they refuse to confess at sentencing hear-
ings, it does not appear that the Court intended such a result. Per-
haps the Court should have distinguished Poteet and simply de-
cided Grayson on the authority of Williams and 18 U.S.C. § 3577.
Such an approach would have permitted the decisions in Poteet and
Scott to remain intact, thereby protecting fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights of the defendant while still enabling the Court to con-
tinue the Williams trend of allowing sentencing judges broader dis-
cretion to consider, for sentencing purposes, various aspects of a
defendant's life and character.
The impact of Grayson will necessarily be limited since judges are
not currently required to articulate the reasons supporting their
64. See United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 1976) (Rosenn, J., dissent-
ing). The factual circumstances in Grayson are clearly distinguishable from those in Poteet
in two distinct respects. First, in Poteet, the sentencing judge attempted to coerce a confes-
sion from the defendant by threatening him with a longer sentence if he refused to confess at
the sentencing hearing. Second, Poteet involved a refusal to confess at the time of sentencing
or allocution, and not perjury on the witness stand. The trial judge emphasized that he was
not concerned with Poteet's false testimony on the stand, but rather with his refusal to confess
after the jury had returned the verdict against him. "It is one thing what you do before the
jury. When you come here for sentence, . . . that's the time for you to come clean, if there's
any hope of your ever coming clean." Id. at 115 (quoting Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d at 393).
See also United States v. Nunn, 527 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. See notes 62 & 63 supra.
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determination of sentences." Until such time as a record of the
sentencing process is required for appellate review, Grayson can be
meaningfully enforced only when a judge chooses to articulate for
the record the reasons for his determination of sentence." Only then
is it possible to insure that the judge considered the defendant's
suspected perjury solely for its reflection on his prospects for reha-
bilitation and not for the purpose of penalizing the defendant for
committing the perjury, or for refusing to confess.
Timothy J Mains
66. See United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103, 104 (3d Cir. 1976). In Grayson, the court
of appeals observed that the trial court quite properly noted that it could, without giving any
explanation, sentence Grayson to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by the stat-
ute. See also Appellate Review, supra note 34, at 1358.
67. The need for judges to articulate the underlying reasons for the sentences they impose
has prompted many suggested reforms that would require them to establish a record of the
sentencing process for appellate review. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENcES: LAW WrrHoJT
ORDER 42-43 (1973). One proposed reform would require a judge, when considering suspected
perjury in determining sentence, to state that fact in the record and to include in the record
the factors which he considered in determining that the defendant had, in fact, committed
perjury. The potential for appellate review of the judge's subjective perception that the
defendant had committed perjury would serve to safeguard the defendant's rights, See Discre-
tionary Penalty Increases, supra note 42, at 691. Additional safeguards which have been
proposed to reduce the chance of error in the judge's subjective perception of the defendant's
suspected perjury would require that the judge be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant intentionally lied on material issues of fact and that the falsity of the defen-
dant's testimony be established by the fact that he was found guilty. See United States v.
Grayson, 550 F.2d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 1976) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).

